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WITTGENSTEIN’S INFLUENCE
Douglas Gasking1
In  the  British  section  of  the  English-speaking  world  —  in  Britain  and  the  British 
Commonwealth — there have been quite considerable changes in the philosophical climate 
during the past twenty or thirty years. So great have changes been that quite a few people do 
not think it  absurd to speak of “the recent revolution2  in philosophy”. And there would be 
pretty general agreement that the changes — the “revolution” if that is not too strong a word — 
are chiefly (though of course not entirely) due to the work of one man, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
an Austrian by birth who worked in Cambridge, England, and who died some ten years ago. In 
America Wittgenstein’s influence has been nothing like as great. But here, too, there are many 
that would rank him as at least among the most important philosophers of the century. There 
are also many who would deplore Wittgenstein’s influence, and think that his followers are 
obscurantists — slippery in argument through unwillingness to be precise, anti-scientific, and 
pedantically literary. 
A most remarkable — and to those outside the trade a rather confusing — thing is that, 
philosophically  speaking,  there  were  two  Wittgensteins.  He  had  two distinct  philosophical 
careers, between which he turned to things other than philosophy; and in the course of these 
two  careers  he  developed  two  quite  distinct  philosophies.  It  is  the  work  of  the  later 
Wittgenstein that has been so widely influential.
I had better start by outlining the two careers.
He was born in Vienna, towards the end of the last century.3 The Wittgenstein family was 
wealthy and cultured. Brahms was a friend of the family, and one of Ludwig’s brothers became 
— despite the fact that he had only one arm — a concert pianist. Ludwig, however, set out to 
become a mechanical engineer and went to England — to Manchester University — to do post-
graduate research on jet  propulsion of  aircraft.  But  he soon became interested in Bertrand 
Russell’s philosophy, and abandoned his engineering career to go and study under Russell at 
Cambridge.
He  worked  with  Russell  for  several  years,  and  towards  the  end  of  this  time  began 
developing a philosophical line of his own. His collaboration with Russell was interrupted by 
the outbreak of World War I, in 1914, when Wittgenstein went home to fight with the Austro-
Hungarian army. He managed to continue philosophical work, despite his war-services, and to 
complete a short, highly-compressed and highly obscure book. This — the only book of his to 
be published during his lifetime — came out in 1922,4 with parallel English and German texts 
on facing pages. It was entitled “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”. The philosophy of the early 
Wittgenstein is that which is contained in this book — a philosophy which its author was later 
to repudiate completely.
After the publication of his Tractatus  Wittgenstein gave up philosophy for six or seven 
years. Tolstoy’s ideas had had a deep effect on him, and he gave up the life of a wealthy and 
learned man to be a village schoolmaster in Austria for several  years.  During this interval 
between his two philosophical careers he also spent one year as an amateur architect, designing 
a house for his sister, and for a while he worked as an under-gardener at a monastery. And then, 
partly  through  the  efforts  of  a  brilliant  young  philosopher  —  Frank  Ramsey  —  he  was 
1. This unpublished paper (here transcribed by Stewart Candlish) was presented by Gasking at the University of 
Illinois in the northern Spring of 1961. All footnotes in this text, including this one, have been supplied by SC.
2. All emphasis in the original ms is indicated by underlining. This has here been replaced throughout by italics; a 
few small but distracting linguistic or typographical errors elsewhere have been silently corrected; the main text is 
otherwise entirely Gasking’s. 
3. That is, the nineteenth century.
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persuaded to return to Cambridge, late in 1927, and to take up philosophy again. From then on 
he worked mainly in Cambridge. He became Professor there in 1939 — but resigned the Chair 
after a few years, to work again as a free-lance. The thought of himself as a professor was one 
that tended to fill him with disgust.
During most of his later years at Cambridge he lectured twice a week, usually in his own 
college sitting room or in that of a pupil, to a small group of some twelve to twenty persons. 
Apart from a short paper (repudiated by him as soon as it was printed in 1929) he published 
nothing. From the early 1930’s onwards his new philosophy — the ideas which are these days 
so widely accepted — were communicated by him verbally to the small groups that attended 
these lectures. But his ideas began to spread nevertheless. Shorthand notes were made of two 
of his lecture-courses and, despite his disapproval and indeed prohibition, typescript copies of 
these had a clandestine world-wide circulation. (These, the so called Blue-Book and Brown-
Book have,  since Wittgenstein’s death,  been printed.)  Other sets of notes made by various 
students  were  duplicated  and  circulated.  Wittgenstein,  meanwhile,  was  working  on  the 
manuscript  of  a  book.  When  this,  his  celebrated  Philosophical  Investigations,  was 
posthumously published in 1953, large sections of the philosophical public had already had a 
sometimes rather garbled preview of its contents. Philosophical Investigations is in a relatively 
finished form, and is the principal source-book for the later Wittgensteinian philosophy.
———————————————————
Wittgenstein’s work was influenced to an exceptionally small degree by his reading of other 
philosophers. It seems to have been very largely the stimulus of oral discussions with one or 
two people that set his thoughts going. The early Wittgenstein was set going by discussions 
with Russell. The later philosophy resulted, according to Wittgenstein’s own account, from the 
stimulus of conversations with Frank Ramsey and with an economist colleague at Cambridge 
by the name of Sraffa. I should like, in giving a rough sketch of some of Wittgenstein’s ideas, 
to try to set these in the context of those trends of thought which, via Russell and others, set 
him off. 
First of all I propose to say something about the early Wittgensteinian philosophy — that of 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In order to place this in its historical setting I shall first 
give a very rough sketch of certain intellectual developments of the later nineteenth century — 
developments that must have (partly, at least) suggested to Russell those philosophical ideas he 
had at the time when the young Wittgenstein became his pupil. 
The rapid development of chemical and physical theory during the nineteenth century led a 
number  of  scientists,  late  in  that  century,  to  raise  philosophical  questions  concerning  the 
imperceptible entities these theories seemed to treat of — entities such as molecules, atoms, 
ether waves, and so on. A sceptic could say: the observable phenomena regularly proceed as if 
they were due to the workings of such theoretical entities — but since no one ever has nor ever 
could observe these entities themselves, what right have we to assert their existence? Are we 
really entitled to say anything more than that observable things proceed as if the theoretical 
entities  existed? There seemed to be a  problem of  justifying a  precarious inference to  the 
forever invisible — a problem remarkably analogous to eighteenth century problems of how, 
given that all we are aware of is our ‘ideas’ or ‘sensations’, we could justify the inference 
thence to a material world. 
Some of the philosophizing scientists did, indeed, come to think the inference illegitimate 
— that we have no adequate ground for believing in the real existence of the entities — the 
atoms,  ether-waves  and so  on — which their  theories  spoke of.  But  they were  unwilling, 
merely on that account, to abandon the theories: no scientist abandons a scientific theory until 
he has a better one to put in its place. They therefore had to say such things as: “Statements in 
the theory are not really about what they seem to be about — i.e. theoretical entities — for 
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these do not exist. They are really about that which alone exists — namely the observable. The 
theory is not to be taken as literally true, but as a useful device for economizing thought — a 
sort of mnemonic picture that helps us to anticipate and control observable phenomena.
It  is  noteworthy  that  this  late  nineteenth  century  positivist  doctrine  was  a  doctrine 
concerning the way our language works: it held that statements couched in terms of scientific 
theory  play a different role in our language  from that played by ordinary  statements about 
observables. Ordinary statements were taken to be literally true or literally false reports of real 
observable happenings among real observable things: theoretical statements were taken to be 
neither true nor false in this sense, since they were not meant to be reports of what was really 
true, but rather to be symbolic devices to help us organise our knowledge about observables. 
On this view there are two ‘levels’ of language — the fact-stating level and the ‘theoretical’ 
level — and utterances on different levels ‘work’ in quite different ways.
A theory of this sort, if correct, sidesteps the sceptic’s challenge. The sceptic says: How can 
you possibly justify the inference from one sort of entity to entities of a quite different sort, if 
no one ever has, ever will or ever could actually observe the latter sort of entity? The answer is: 
“There’s no need to justify any inference, for there is no inference. In setting up a theory you 
aren’t inferring  facts about real but unobservable entities: you’re doing something different 
from this.” Nevertheless a positivist theory, if it is expounded in this sort of way only, is quite 
vague on the question of what sort of logical relations, if any, do hold between the different 
levels.
Russell, however, who started his career as a mathematician, had a very definite and precise 
idea of what sort of relation there must be — an idea fairly evidently derived from certain 
nineteenth century developments in mathematics. Earlier mathematicians had operated freely 
and profitably with such notions as that of an irrational number and of an infinitesimal, despite 
the fact that the notions, as then presented, were logically incoherent. In the nineteenth century 
these notions were made thoroughly respectable, logically, when it was shown how they could 
be defined in terms of simpler, unproblematic ideas. But the sense in which such a notion as 
that of ‘√2’ was defined was a quite novel one — quite different from the traditional idea of a 
definition as typified by, for instance, “a triangle is a plane rectilinear three-sided figure”. The 
latter defines the word ‘triangle’ in isolation, by setting up an equivalence between this word as 
such and a defining phrase. The new sort of definition does not do this: “√2”, for instance, is 
not defined in isolation. Instead rules are given whereby any complete statement in which the 
symbol “√2” occurs can be translated as a whole into some other complete statement in which 
the  expression  “√2”  and  others  like  it  do  not  occur.  For  instance:  the  statement  is  to  be 
translated as a whole into “There is at least one fraction greater than ½ whose square is less 
than 2”. But no particular translation is provided for the expression “√2” as such. It is defined 
only “in context” or “in use”, as Russell would put it. By such definitions in use — rules for 
translating sentences as wholes — such a notion as that of “√2” was said to be “reduced to” 
that of ordinary rational number. 
This  notion  of  a  definition-in-use  cleared  up  a  number  of  obstinate  puzzles  in  the 
philosophy of mathematics.  Russell  saw in it,  early in this  century,5  the key idea that  was 
similarly to solve philosophical problems outside the field of mathematics. Notably it was to 
clear up those cases where we seemed to be in the position of making a rash inference from the 
known to the unknown, and of being unable to justify our inference in the face of sceptical 
criticism.  The  trick,  as  Russell  put  it,  was  to  “replace  an  inferred  entity  by  a  logical 
construction”, that is, to show that the supposed inferred entity is really definable in terms of 
observables  —  definable,  that  is,  in  the  way  that  “√2”  is  definable  in  terms  of  ordinary 
fractions.  Are  there  doubts  about  the  inference  from  observables  to  the  the  unobservable 
entities  of  scientific  theory?  Resolve  them  by  showing  how,  in  principle,  any  statement 
5. That is, the twentieth century.
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purporting  to  be  about  an  unobservable  entity  can  be  translated  into  statements  about 
observables. Are there doubts, of the traditional sort, about the inference from our sensations to 
the existence of material objects? Resolve them by showing how statements, ostensibly about 
material objects, are translatable or ‘analysable’ into statements about sensations. 
Russell, in fact, came to the view that — in the sense in which the statement ‘√2 > ½’ is not 
about a peculiar entity called ‘√2’ — in that sense most ordinary statements are not really about 
the objects they purport to be about. And just as (it might be held), you give the real meaning 
of ‘√2 > ½’ when you give its correct analysis, namely ‘At least one fraction greater than ½ has 
a square less than 2’ — so also, to give the real  meaning of most ordinary statements you 
would have to give their analyses. When an everyday statement is translated in this way the 
resulting statement, in its completely analysed form, would  be about what it purports to be 
about.
It was against the background of such ideas, and in a rather similar spirit, that Wittgenstein 
wrote his Tractatus.  He says in it,  for instance, “Russell’s merit  is to have shown that the 
apparent logical form of the proposition need not be its real form”. The Tractatus accepts the 
idea that most statements would need translating into “fully analysed form” before they would 
really be about what they purported to be about. And it raises, among other things, the very 
general question: What features must be possessed by any language whatsoever, if it is to be 
capable of doing what language does? Wittgenstein notes that it is of the essence of language 
that we can often understand a sentence we have never heard before, provided that it is built up 
out  of  familiar  words.  And he asks:  How  is  it  possible  that  we should understand such a 
sentence,  without  ever  having  had  its  sense  explained  to  us?  His  answer  is  his  so-called 
“Picture theory of meaning”. A sentence can be understood the very first time it is heard only 
because  the  sentences  of  a  language  are,  in  a  certain  respect,  like  pictures  or  models.  A 
sentence admittedly does not resemble the fact it states: but it is also not essential that a model 
or picture should actually resemble what it states. You could, for instance, let a certain pen and 
pencil represent Mr Smith and Mr Jones respectively, let a certain book represent a certain 
house,  and  let  the  relation  of  resting  upon  represent  the  relation  of  owning.  Once  these 
‘representing conventions’ are laid down, you can place the pencil on the book; — and then the 
fact that the pencil is resting on the book will represent the fact that Mr Jones owns the house 
in question. And a person, provided he knows the representing conventions, will understand 
what is meant by the pencil resting upon the book, as soon as he sees this for the first time, 
without any further explanation.
The essence of language, according to the picture-theory, is seen in the above example. The 
pencil’s resting on the book is a fact, which consists of these elements — the pencil, the book 
and the relation of resting-upon. The fact consists in these three elements ‘hanging together’, as 
it were. And the fact, in virtue of the representing conventions, asserts another fact: namely Mr 
Jones’ ownership of the house. This latter fact also consists of three elements — Mr Jones, the 
house, and the relation of owning — all three of them ‘hanging together’. The hanging together 
of the elements of the former fact asserts  the hanging together of the represented elements 
which comprise the latter fact.
A further Tractatus doctrine is that there must be something common to two facts if it is to 
be possible at all  for one to be used to assert  the other.  Any possible  language must  have 
certain features in common with the facts it asserts. But it is impossible to say, in any language, 
what these features are. To do so you would have to use a language which did not have these 
features; and this is impossible. However, this which cannot be said in any language, shows 
itself in language. This difficult doctrine of the unsayable which nevertheless shows itself is 
another of the main themes of the book.
Wittgenstein’s  later  work is  very different  from this  in  spirit  and in  manner.  And it  is 
possible, I think, to see in it to some extent the indirect influence of the greatest of all American 
philosophers, C. S. Peirce. The evidence for this is as follows: The years 1927–1930, when 
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Wittgenstein had just returned to Cambridge and to philosophy, were evidently the period when 
the new philosophy was germinating. A paper written about this time (and repudiated by its 
author as soon as it appeared in print, if not before) shows Wittgenstein still philosophizing in 
the  manner  of  the  Tractatus.  And  documents  from  the  early  1930’s  show  him  already 
beginning  to  do  philosophy  in  the  manner  of  the  later  Philosophical  Investigations.  Now 
during these crucial years he had, he tells us “innumerable conversations” with Frank Ramsey, 
which forced him to recognize “grave mistakes” in his earlier work. What were Ramsey and he 
talking about in these “innumerable conversations” during the last two years of Ramsey’s life? 
We have evidence of what Ramsey was thinking about and writing about at that time, for the 
posthumously published collected papers of his include various dated manuscripts from this 
time. Ramsey had been reading Norman Campbell’s “Physics, the Elements” — and working 
on Campbell’s account of the logic of theories in physics. And he had also just read and been 
deeply impressed by the collection of Peirce’s papers which was entitled “Chance, Love and 
Logic”. In a number of manuscripts Ramsey adopts and works on ‘pragmaticist’ notions of 
Peirce. (Peirce, it will be recalled, re-christened his philosophy ‘pragmaticism’ to distinguish it 
from James’s ‘pragmatism’.) Now it seems exceedingly probable that in his conversations at 
that  time  with  Wittgenstein  he  would  be  bringing  pragmaticist  criticisms  to  bear  on 
Wittgenstein’s  earlier  philosophy.  The  hypothesis  that  this  actually  took  place  is  further 
supported by the fact that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is very much closer to ‘pragmaticism’ 
than his earlier philosophy had been.
What is common to the two is not so much specific doctrines as a common ‘spirit’ and 
certain general ‘themes’. Here are some aspects of Peirce’s philosophy which, as we shall see, 
are analogous to certain features in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.
(a) Many previous philosophers had tended to talk as though the essence of such mental 
activities and states as believing, thinking, inquiring, coming to know was the occurrence of 
some state  or process  in the mind of the one who believes, thinks and so on — a state or 
process open to his introspection, but private to him. Peirce, following Bain, gave a behaviorist 
account of belief: to believe, for him, was to have a certain habit of action. And a habit of 
action is, of course, something public, open to anyone to observe if he will. One of the chief 
contentions  of  the  later  Wittgenstein  is  that  statements  about  believing,  expecting,  hoping, 
feeling pain or anger, intending and so on are not to be construed as reports of private episodes 
in the mind of some person — that for such statements there must always be public checks. 
(b) Peirce insists that our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects — of the effects 
that might conceivably have practical bearings. Giving an example of the application of the 
pragmatist rule to the clarifying of the concept of ‘force’ he says: “we must begin by asking 
what  is  the  immediate  use  of  thinking  about  force”.  Compare  Wittgenstein’s  dictum:  “the 
meaning of an expression is its use”. 
(c)  Unlike  many  other  philosophers,  who  tended  to  talk  of  inquiry  and  the  getting  of 
knowledge as if it were something that an isolated individual could do, Peirce stressed that 
inquiry  is  a  social  and  cooperative  affair:  “In  sciences  in  which  which  men  come  to 
agreement”, he says, “when a theory has been broached it is considered to be on probation until 
the agreement is reached.” Wittgenstein too, stresses the fact that knowledge must be public; 
and  stresses  the  fact  the  certain  agreements  in  judgment  are  essential  for  certain  types  of 
knowledge to be possible e.g. (p. 225) “Mathematicians do not in general quarrel over the 
result of a calculation. (This is an important fact.) If it were otherwise . . . then our concept of 
‘mathematical certainty’ would not exist.”
(d) Peirce says: “Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our 
hearts.” (C. L. C. p. 2) Compare Wittgenstein: (p. 224) “I can be as certain of someone else’s 
sensations as of any fact . . .” (an imagined objector) “But if you are certain, isn’t it that you 
are shutting your eyes in the face of doubt?” Wittgenstein replies: “They are shut.”
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These quotations may have given some impression of the sort of view that Wittgenstein was 
putting forward in Philosophical Investigations.  I shall now try to set out, systematically if 
briefly, some of the main points made in that book. (Naturally I shall be a bit selective.)
————————————————————
In  the  earlier  Tractatus  Wittgenstein  had  asked  what  must  essentially  be  the  case  for 
something like a sentence, or a diagram, or a map to express some actual or possible fact. His 
account,  you will  recall,  was in terms of elements of one fact  being appointed,  by certain 
correlation conventions, to represent or stand for elements in another fact. And in the whole 
book there is very little mention of the people who use these sentences, and little discussion of 
what is involved in using sentences, meaning something by them, understanding them, and so 
on. In Philosophical Investigations the whole emphasis is quite different: not on sentences and 
words,  but  on people  who use  language in  the  furtherance of  their  various  activities.  The 
Tractatus notion of the meaning of a word being a matter of what element of reality it was 
conventionally appointed to stand for or name comes in for explicit criticism. “To understand a 
language” it is said “is to understand a form of life.” — Early in the book Wittgenstein gives 
the following description of a rather artificially simple case of language using:
(p. 2) “I send someone shopping . . . ‘five’ is used.”
Notice here how Wittgenstein says “Explanations come to an end somewhere.” Elsewhere 
he remarks “The chain of reasons must come to an end.” This is a very central point in his 
thinking, which I shall try to expound in my own way.
If someone disputes a mathematical statement I may give him a proof of it; starting with 
something he assents to and proceeding thence by a chain of very simple steps, each one of 
which is so obvious that he cannot but admit it, till I lead him, after the last such step, to assent 
to the statement he had disputed. Let us consider a very  simple instance of what would be 
essentially the same sort of thing. Imagine that your young son gets, as a present, a box of tiny 
building  blocks  of  various  shapes  and sizes.  With  it  come detailed  instructions,  copiously 
illustrated by diagrams, of how to build various things — a bridge, an airplane, a hotel with 
swimming pool, and so on. You amuse yourself by building the bridge illustrated on the box, 
following the instructions it gives. Your son, viewing your handiwork, claims that what you’ve 
made isn’t exactly the thing illustrated on the box — that you’ve got it wrong somehow. You 
claim it is what the instructions for building do produce. How could this dispute be settled?
Assume that the given instructions are very  detailed, with illustrative diagrams of some 
familiar conventional sort, showing you what to do next at every stage in the building of the 
model, and showing you what correct compliance with the instructions for that particular step 
would look like. In that case you could settle the dispute as to what you should have built as 
the bridge, by starting at the beginning again, and going carefully through the building again, 
step by simple step, at each step checking with the instructions and diagrams for that step to 
make sure it is right. This procedure, if it can be relied on that you do each very simple step in 
the sequence correctly, will show conclusively what the completed bridge was meant to look 
like. (This would be analogous to proving a theorem in mathematics.)
Suppose that at one of the steps in the operation a dispute arises as to whether what you 
have done is the right thing to do at that point. To justify what you have done you could point 
to the relevant diagram of what to do at that stage, and say: “Look — it shows you here that 
this is what you’re supposed to do!” (This is analogous to a step in your calculation or proof 
being challenged — and your justifying it by saying “I’m simply subtracting the same thing 
from both sides.”) Pointing to the relevant diagram or calculation-rule could be said to be 
giving a reason for taking the next step in the way you do.
Suppose the other person agrees that the rule or conventional diagram you cite as justifying 
your step in building a proof is the right one, but insists that you are misinterpreting it,  or 
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applying it wrongly to this case. He says perhaps — “No look at the diagram — surely this is 
what it means you to do here, not what you did!” Or if it is a step in a mathematical proof, he 
may say something similar, or perhaps say “No, I just don’t see it — I can’t follow it at all — I 
don’t see what dividing through would come to in this case — I don’t see that you’ve divided 
through at all!” If we assume that the step in question is a very very simple one — so that 
there’s no question of interposing an intermediate step — what can you do now? You can’t 
now give him a reason any more: all you can do is repeat what you’ve said and exhort him, in 
persuasive tones, “But just look at it — can’t you see? Think man, use your brains!”
There is no reason to be given at this stage. Either he sees it or he doesn’t — and if he does 
see it he will do it without having, or being able to give, a reason in justification. (The appeal: 
“Can’t you see it? Surely you must see!” isn’t a reason, it’s an exhortation.) But even though he 
can’t (in the very simple cases) be given a reason to justify making the right interpretation, and 
can’t be given a reason for not making the wrong interpretation — even so there is a right and 
wrong here. That which he does in either case without reason may be correct or it may be 
mistaken. He is not entitled to insist that any interpretation that strikes him as correct must be 
correct.
How is it settled whether a person is correct or not when he claims that a certain calculation 
rule applied here results in this, or claims that a certain conventional diagram, as applied to the 
case in hand, means one has to do this? He is correct in the former claim if and only if almost 
anyone else who has been instructed in the relevant branch of mathematics would apply the 
rule, in this case, as he does. And he is correct in the latter case if and only if almost anyone 
else who has learnt to interpret this sort of diagram would do, in the given case, what he thinks 
is what the diagram calls for. In other words the criterion of correct interpretation of a rule or 
diagram (in the simple cases) is in accordance with the common practice of a group of people 
who have a common practice in applying such rules or interpreting such diagrams. Another 
very simple illustration. A person who thinks the numeral words should be recited in the order 
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 5, 7, 8 etc is wrong‚ —wrong because the community to which he belongs has the 
practice of reciting them in a different order.
There is then, in such cases, a right and a wrong way of applying a rule in a given case, 
even though, in the simple cases, we can’t get him to do the right thing by giving him a reason 
for doing it. [If we tell a person that a certain way of interpreting the rule in a particular case is 
that which conforms with the standard common practice this isn’t giving him a reason  for 
making this interpretation — it’s giving him a reason for thinking this interpretation is the 
correct one — something different!]
When there is a right and a wrong thing to do — but a person can’t be got to do the right 
thing by being given a reason for doing it — as in the cases we are considering — how do we 
get him to do the right thing, and to do it regularly? The answer is simple and straightforward: 
— by training him in the common practices of his group. The typical technique is the familiar 
pedagogical one of giving the pupil a few examples of what it is to do the right thing, then 
getting him (under supervision) to try his hand at doing it himself on some other examples, and 
correcting him when he goes wrong and encouraging him when he is right. In favourable cases 
— for instance with most though not all human beings in the learning of (say) simple addition 
— such training or drill will lead your pupil thereafter to do, on his own, what anyone else 
would do who had been through the training. The training makes him a participator in the 
common practices of the group. He like they will, in all sorts of different cases, do the right 
thing (that is what the group does) in various different situations — and like them will do it 
without a reason, because he has been trained.
It is just a large-scale fact about the world — which could conceivably have been different 
in this respect — that the sort of training described does produce a common practice. It is, so to 
speak, an accident that people exposed to training in certain mathematical calculations will 
thereafter agree on how the rule applies — that the same application will strike all of them as 
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the right, the natural one. But for this there would be no rules of mathematical calculation and 
no mathematics.
Now the points just established with regard to mathematics, and the like, apply in a closely 
parallel way in other fields. If someone, for instance, claims that a certain bird is a flamingo, he 
can give reasons in support of the claim — that it has long legs and neck, that its plumage is 
bright red, and so on. But if you and he are standing, in broad daylight, in front of a flamingo, 
and he disputes your claim that the thing before you both is red — what reason can you give in 
defence of that? What could you do but expostulate — But look at it! Can’t you see it’s red? 
But here, too, where no reason can be given for a correct statement, there nevertheless is a 
difference between right and wrong. As in the case of the calculation-rule the test is (roughly at 
least) your statement is correct if and only if it accords with what would be said, were he in 
your place, by anyone else who has learned to use the colour words. It is correct if it accords 
with the uniform practice of  your group.  And as in the case of  basic calculation-rules the 
correct use of colour words is imparted to people by means of a certain training or drill. And it 
is again a large-scale accident, so to speak, that training does produce a common practice in the 
use of colour-words. The very possibility of there being a right and a wrong in the use of 
colour words depends on the fact that training will  produce agreement in colour-judgments 
among the trainees. Wittgenstein says: “If language is to be means of communication there 
must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This 
seems to abolish logic but does not do so”. He imagines an objector saying at this point: “So 
you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” And he replies 
“It is what human beings say that is true and false, and they agree in the language they use. 
That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.”
One  of  the  most  characteristic  and  important  of  the  views  advanced  in  Philosophical 
Investigations — the rejection of the possibility of a purely private or subjective language — 
follows immediately from the points just made.
Consider such statements as “I have a pain”; “I have an itch”; “I am now having a visual 
image of a red rose”. Many people would be inclined to say of these that in making them the 
speaker is telling us of the occurrence of a particular sort of experience of his — that he can, as 
it were, see into his own mind and there detect certain mental entities — pains, itches, visual 
images — whose presence he reports to us, and whose nature he describes. One is inclined to 
think that just as one can observe, report on and describe a red rose out there, so a person can 
observe a red visual image within him, report on it and describe it. The difference between the 
cases, so many would say, is that in the sort of first-person singular remark I have mentioned, 
the speaker is reporting on and describing something private, something only he can be directly 
aware of. Let’s call this the inner-object theory. 
Wittgenstein  holds  that  this  line  of  thought,  very  natural  though  it  be,  is  completely 
mistaken. He has an argument to show that — from the very nature of language as such — one 
could  not  describe  such  an  utterly  private  entity  as  the  inner-object  theory  supposes  one 
describes. 
Let’s  consider  the statement  “I  am in pain”.  If  this  reports  the occurrence of  a  private 
object, your pain — which only you can inspect — how have you come to use the name ‘pain’ 
for it? The answer seems obvious: when you were a child you sometimes cut yourself and 
cried; sometimes fell over and whimpered — and so on. And on those occasions your parents 
and others from whom you picked up your English told you ‘You are in pain.’ So you were told 
to  say ‘I  am in  pain’ on the  occurrence of  certain  public  happenings  — bleeding fingers, 
whimpering, falling over and the like. But, say you, ‘pain’ is not the name you give to these 
public events — but to the private inner experience that you (and only you) are aware of when 
these public events occur.  It  names,  you think,  that  sort  of  inner experience that  regularly 
accompanies a certain sort of public event.
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But if that’s the story we can ask you: how do you know that the inner experience that 
accompanies cuts, bruises, tooth-extractions and so on is the same sort  of inner experience 
each time? “Well — you may reply — I certainly take it to be the same, it feels the same to me 
— it strikes me as the same — that’s why in each case I describe it by the same word ‘pain’. I 
can recognise it, when it comes again, as another experience of the same sort as I had before 
when I cut myself.”
The question then arises: How can you be sure you recognize it correctly, that you aren’t 
mixing things up? (Remember you are claiming to be simply reporting the nature of an inner 
experience  — so  you  must  go  by  that  alone  — it  wouldn’t  do  to  say:  I  know that  this 
experience I  now have is  pain  again,  because I  have again cut  my finger,  and pain is  the 
experience you get when you cut your finger, and the like. For if this is your answer you are 
not using the word pain purely as a description of the inner private experience: in this case 
‘pain’ for you would mean “the inner experience — whatever its quality as experience may be 
— which regularly accompanies cuts, visits to dentists and the like”. Thus if you are really to 
use the word pain simply to describe a certain sort of character of inner private experience, then 
you cannot check on the correctness or otherwise of your statement “this is pain that I now 
feel”  by  reference  to  cuts  and  bruises.  It  must  be  done  purely  by  reference  to  the  inner 
experience itself.
So look inside, contemplate the experience you now have. Is it or is it not sufficiently like 
what you had yesterday when you said you were in pain for it to be correct for you to apply to 
it that same name again? If you say it is sufficiently like it, can you justify that claim by giving 
a reason for thinking it to be the same? The one good reason you might have given for thinking 
this to be another case of pain — namely that this is another case of cutting yourself — is not 
available to you, by hypothesis, if you are claiming your statement to be purely a report of 
inner experience. And it will be no use trying to give as a reason some other fact (or supposed 
fact) that has to do purely with the inner. If you do, the same problems will arise about it.
Perhaps, then, your statement that this present experience, quâ experience, has the same 
quality as one you previously described as ‘pain’ — perhaps this statement is one of those 
which can,  and indeed must,  be made without any reason, but which may nevertheless be 
correct? Perhaps it’s like ‘This is red’, or like ‘This is what the rule tells you to do in this case’? 
But if so, there must be some way of distinguishing correct from incorrect statements that this 
inner experience is like that previous one. If your word ‘pain’ simply describes what you alone 
are aware of — then there can be no training of others in its use (in that  meaning) — no 
common practice of a group, therefore, of that sort which in other cases does furnish a criterion 
of correctness. And so there is no way of distinguishing between correct and incorrect. 
But in that case suppose the experience strikes you as the same as before; suppose you have 
the impression that it is the same experience again, namely that which you call ‘pain’. There is 
now no conceivable way left of distinguishing between true impressions of this sort and false 
impressions, between its striking you that way and really being so, and its striking you that way 
and its not being so. You may say anything you have a mind to say: nothing can go wrong.
But then — if the rules of the language are — “You may say whatever takes your fancy, 
whatever you say will be all right” then there are no rules, and it’s no language and you aren’t 
really saying anything. 
The hypothesis that your first-person statements might really be sheer descriptions of inner 
experiences open to you alone turns out, by analysis, to be incoherent.
